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Abstract 
This paper examines the development of cooperative strategies between countries exporting Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) and members of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). This economic 
study focuses specifically on an often-raised scenario: the emergence of a cooperative approach 
designed with the sole aim of logistic rationalization, and which would not have any effect on LNG 
prices. We first assess the annual gains that may result from this market-power-free cooperative 
approach using a simple static transportation model. The numerical results obtained suggest that, in the 
absence of a gain redistribution policy, this cooperative strategy will probably not be adopted because 
cooperation would not be a rational move for some exporters. The problem of gain sharing is then 
formulated using cooperative game theory concepts. Several gain-sharing methods have been studied, 
including the Shapley value and various nucleolus-inspired concepts. Our results suggest that the 
choice of a redistribution policy appears relatively restricted. Out of the methods studied, only one – 
per capita nucleolus – satisfies two key requirements: core belonging and monotonicity (in the 
aggregate). Lastly, we look at how cooperation may give rise to a coordination cost and try to 
determine the maximum amount of this cost. In view of the low level of this amount and the relative 
complexity of the sharing method implemented, we consider that the credibility of a logistic 
cooperation scenario exempt from market power should be reappraised.   
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Introduction 
In the gas industry, the establishment of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), founded in 2001 
in Tehran, is undoubtedly one of the key events of the last few years. For the first time in history, the 
main gas exporting states, existing or emerging, got over the first steps to implement a cooperative 
approach. All the meetings of this informal inter-ministerial assembly (Hallouche, 2006) have given 
rise to plenty of comments. Indeed, the concentration of reserves1, the precedent constituted by the 
OPEC (to which several GECF member states also belong) and the similarities between oil and natural 
gas (comparable technologies used in the exploration and production phases, analogies in terms of 
concentration of reserves) are all familiar topics when examining the long-term future of this industry.  
Concerning the GECF, one of the major questions is how this group of exporters might behave. 
According to the dichotomy proposed by C. Mandil2, two possibilities can be envisaged, depending on 
whether the GECF will seek to exercise market power or not. In the first case, the GECF would 
behave like a cartel, while in the second, it would concentrate on promoting regional cooperation as "a 
think tank for gas exporting countries, enabling them to consider the best possible conditions for the 
exercise of their mission" (Mandil, 2008). In the first scenario, economic theory provides models for 
analyzing the GECF profitability. For example, Jaffe and Soligo (2006) model the gas-OPEC as a 
dominant firm facing a competitive fringe to illustrate the collective market power that could be 
exerted by that organization3. However, as yet, there has been no examination of the other alternative: 
a cooperation that would be conducted without exerting any collective market power, i.e. without any 
effect on the prices paid by importing countries. This is the aim of this paper. 
It is no surprise to note a revival of an early literature dedicated to international trade in natural gas 
and more specifically the theme of cooperation between exporters (Percebois, 1989 pp. 559-582). 
Some recent publications (e.g.: Hallouche, 2006; Finon, 2007; Wagbara, 2007; Tönjes and de Jong, 
2007, Percebois, 2008) offer an in-depth description of the GECF and provide the basics required for 
more detailed analyses, such as those concerning (i) the attitude of each of the GECF member 
countries in relation to cooperation or (ii) the effect that cartelization would have on the importing 
countries. These contributions examine the subject in the broad perspective of geopolitics.  
Besides, it can be judicious to implement an analytical approach grounded in economic theory. 
Hopefully, the literature dedicated to the gas industry provides numerous examples of insightful 
contributions obtained thanks to comprehensive quantitative models. Examples include the numerical 
market equilibrium models inspired by Mathiesen et al. (1987) either in a competitive perspective 
                                                 
1 Three countries – Russia, Iran and Qatar – alone hold 55% of the planet’s proven reserves of natural gas (BP, 2008). 
According to Hallouche (2006), the countries represented at the 2004 GECF assembly collectively held 87% of global gas 
reserves.   
2 Former Executive Director of the International Energy Agency. 
3 Following Cremer and Weitzman (1976), that "dominant firm" approach has been used in many models of OPEC. 
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(Hartley and Medlock, 2006) or in a Cournot oligopoly one (Golombek et al., 1995; Boots et al., 2004; 
Holz et al., 2008; Egging et al., 2008)4. Occasionally, these model-based contributions have proven to 
be helpful in dismissing conventional wisdom expectations5. This article aims at building on that 
analytical literature.  
We focus on Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), since GECF countries have a privileged position in this 
respect: they collectively hold almost 90% of the world’s liquefaction capacities (Hallouche, 2006, p. 
25), an impressive figure that has raised concerns about the possible emergence of "an association of 
some kind among LNG exporters" (Yergin and Stoppard, 2003). During the last 10-15 years, LNG 
trade has undergone an average growth of +7.44% a year since 2000 and represents almost 30% of 
today's international trade in gas (BP, 2008). Simultaneously, significant cost reductions – including 
economies of scale in the design of liquefaction plants (Jensen, 2003), an increased competition 
among liquefaction technology suppliers (Greaker and Sagen, 2008) and a drop in the unit cost of 
LNG shipping (Brito and Hartley, 2007; Rosendahl and Sagen, 2009) – have been experienced in that 
industry. These trends have resulted in the development of remote, and previously unexploited, 
resources and the expansion of transoceanic exchanges between previously isolated markets (Jensen, 
2003).  
The current organization of the LNG industry remains largely shaped by its history. Heavy 
investments are required to cover the financial needs of LNG projects. Because of the conditions 
imposed by fund lenders, most of the existing liquefaction terminals have been designed as part of 
integrated supply projects that also included cryogenic vessels and regasification facilities. The 
commercial arrangements attached to these projects usually involve complex long-term (typically 20 
years) sale and purchase agreements that commonly link specific buyers’ and sellers’ facilities in a 
bidding inflexible pairing. According to these contracts, LNG tankers are usually committed to shuttle 
between a specific liquefaction plant and a specific destination (Jensen, 2004). As a result, current 
LNG flows are clearly dependent on past contractual decisions. On a global level, the aggregation of 
these contractual flows offers many opportunities for cross-shipping savings (Jensen, 2003). For 
example (GIIGNL, 2008), Trinidad and Tobago has a contract to supply 1.19 million tons of LNG per 
year (mt/y) to Cartagena (Spain). Simultaneously, Algeria is committed to shipping 3.2 mt/y of LNG 
to Lake Charles (USA). In both cases, under the provisions of the Delivered Ex Ship (DES) contract, 
the supplier is responsible for transportation6. In view of the respective geographical positions, these 
two LNG exporters could consider a profitable shipping coordination.  
                                                 
4 In this vein, we can also mention the collection of models prepared for the 23rd edition of the Energy Modeling Forum. See 
EMF (2007) and the individual papers collected and edited by Huntington in a special issue of the Energy Journal 
(Huntington, 2009).  
5 A recent example is given by Rosendahl and Sagen (2009) who show how, in a competitive environment, a reduced gas 
transportation cost does not necessarily lead to lower prices in the importing regions. 
6 These DES provisions stipulate that the buyer agrees to purchase, receive and pay the Seller for LNG at a unique and 
predefined delivery point. 
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Recently, flexible destination cargo trading has emerged and has induced new market opportunities 
(cf. Yepes Rodríguez (2008) for an appropriate valuation of destination flexibility). Recent empirical 
evidence suggests that these arbitrages could prop up a regional price convergence across the Atlantic 
basin (Neumann, 2009). However, Brown and Yücel (2009) also note that variations in crude oil 
prices could also explain those apparent coordinated movements in natural gas prices. Further 
empirical analysis would certainly benefit from reliable and detailed information on cargo redirections 
and contractual structures. Unfortunately, the current opacity of the LNG industry impedes those 
further investigations. Morever, it must be reaffirmed that this move is limited to the Atlantic Basin 
(the USA and some Western European countries). In the rest of the world, LNG redirections remain 
largely motivated by importers balancing needs and price differences are not necessarily predominant 
in these decisions7. Besides, even if the market creates the conditions for cargo diversion, it can not be 
effective unless contractual clauses allow it. In many cases, the persistence of binding contractual 
limitations (either DES arrangements or rigid destination clauses in FOB arrangements) makes 
arbitrage almost impossible, with only rare exceptions (outages or other exceptional cases)8. As a 
result, it seems reasonable to assume that there are still considerable contractual rigidities in the LNG 
industry.  
In this context, some observers have suggested that the GECF could play an intermediation role by 
identifying opportunities for logistic rationalization between GECF members (Wagbara, 2007). Taking 
that perspective, we aim at providing an ex-post evaluation of the gains that could have been obtained 
if such an optimization had been implemented during a given year, for example: 2006, 2007 or 2008. 
In terms of the GECF countries as a group, determining an optimal shipping rationalization is similar 
to resolving a standard transportation problem. This transportation problem has fuelled a rich literature 
in both economic theory (Koopmans, 1949; Kantorovich, 1960) and operations research with a famous 
formulation proposed by Dantzig (1951). Note that this logistic optimization has no impact on the 
price paid by the importing countries9. 
Several questions now arise. Firstly, what collective gain is likely to be achieved by such a 
coordination of exports within the GECF? Can we expect the spontaneous adoption of a coordinated 
policy without implementing a redistribution mechanism designed to create an incentive compatible 
cooperation? In other words, is such a collective gain attainable without worsening any member's 
profit? If no, the coordination wouldn’t be possible unless a money transfer among participants could 
be implemented. But in that case, is it possible to identify a redistribution policy likely to encourage 
all the stakeholders to cooperate within the GECF? Is the current composition of the GECF the best 
                                                 
7 Zhuravleva (2009) enumerates several barriers that hamper the commoditization of LNG markets, including: inappropriate 
market regulations, technical and market restrictions, the high transaction costs imposed by an illiquid and opaque market...  
8 For the future, we could envisage that future renegotiation of existing long-term contracts will somehow phase out these 
restrictions (Zhuravleva, 2009). But this is obviously a long-run process that can not be reasonably taken into consideration in 
a study focusing on the current LNG industry.  
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suited to this coordination, or would it be in the interest of certain participants to cooperate within the 
framework of a restricted coalition? All these questions refer to the concepts of cooperative game 
theory, which analyzes the distribution of gains resulting from cooperation between economic players. 
This theory has been used in a wide variety of contexts. Applications linked to energy include such 
diverse examples as the regional cooperation in planning an electricity supply system between three 
states in India (Gately, 1974); the measurement of market power in the Western American coal 
industry (Wolak and Kolstad, 1988); the sharing of joint costs in a distribution planning situation at 
Norsk Hydro (Engevall et al., 1998); the allocation of electricity transmission cost (Kattuman et al., 
2004) and the allocation of a refinery’s CO2 emissions (Pierru, 2007)… In this paper, we analyze the 
credibility of the so-called "rationalization" argument by studying the feasibility of a cooperation 
which focuses solely on the logistic optimization of LNG supply chains, without trying to exert any 
upward pressure on prices. Finally, we aim to discuss the credibility of such a "market-power-neutral" 
cooperation. 
The next section details and discusses the assumptions used in this study. Section 3 justifies the 
formulation of the GECF's problem in the form of a linear program. It also provides an evaluation of 
the transportation gains that could have been earned either in 2006, 2007 or 2008, if such a logistic 
cooperation had been implemented. According to these results, such a cooperation would be 
collectively profitable. However, some countries would not spontaneously adhere to this collectively 
optimal export policy. As a gain-sharing rule is needed, section 4 discusses this issue with the help of 
cooperative game theory concepts. It sets achievable gain-sharing schemes using basic solutions as 
well as more advanced ones such as the Shapley value, the nucleolus and some of its derivatives. The 
last section concludes the paper. 
1. Assumptions 
This first section presents the notations and discusses the assumptions used in this article.  
1.1 Notations  
 t , a given year, either 2006, 2007 or 2008;   
 tN , the set of GECF members that exported LNG in year t ;  
 i , an LNG exporting country;  
 j , an LNG importing country;  
 tn , the number of GECF countries that exported LNG in year t ;  
 td , the number of destinations that received some LNG from GECF countries in year t ; 
                                                                                                                                                        
9 This is compatible with the medium-term price rigidity resulting from long-term contracts. In these contracts, prices and 
indexing formulas are negotiated and fixed for periods of approximately 3 years.  
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 t
ijq , the (non-negative) annual quantity of LNG shipped from i  to j  during year t ;  
 t
ijQ , the annual quantity of LNG that has been effectively shipped from i  to j  in year t ; 
 t
jP , the annual average import price of LNG in j  during year t . It gives the value of LNG at 
the gate of j 's regasification plants;
  
 
 iC , the unit cost of natural gas extracted and liquefied in i ; 
 ijT , the unit cost of transporting a given quantity of LNG from i to j .  
For the sake of clarity, it must be underlined that the approach considered here is static and relates 
only to an annual time horizon. Each year t  is considered as a different instance and is thus modeled 
independently. As no ambiguity arises, the subscript t  has thus been dropped to simplify the 
notations. For the same reason, we also define  
 1,...,i ij j d
q q

 , the vector of i 's annual deliveries to 
the different destinations during a given year and  
 1,...,i ij j d
Q Q

  those effectively observed.  
1.2 Framework and numerical assumptions  
LNG exporting countries 
In this study, the list of countries likely to adopt coordination includes all the non-OECD exporting 
countries10 that have participated in a GECF meeting (Hallouche, 2006): Algeria, Brunei, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea (only after the opening of its first liquefaction plant in 2007), Indonesia, Libya, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Trinidad & Tobago and the United Arab Emirates. Hence, n  is equal 
to 11 in 2006 and to 12 in 2007 and 2008.  
LNG importing countries 
The following list of importing countries has been considered: Belgium, China (only after the start of 
its imports from GECF countries in 2007), Dominican Republic, France, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, Portugal, Puerto Rico, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, the UK and the USA. 
Production and liquefaction costs 
The unit costs iC  are displayed in Table 9 in Appendix A. These costs include two components: 
extraction and liquefaction. A common technology has been assumed for all the liquefaction plants 
                                                 
10 Australia, Norway (which holds an observer status at the GECF) and the United States (Alaska) also export LNG. 
However, it is very unlikely that these countries would agree to join the GECF (Tönjes and de Jong, 2007). Similarly, the 
modest Belgian re-exportations observed in 2008 have also been neglected. 
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resulting in a uniform cost of $1.00 per MMBtu these operations (DTI, 2005). Extraction costs11 
exhibit some variations due to differences in geological endowments. 
LNG ships transport costs 
For each ij  route, the unit cost values ijT  
are presented in Table 9 in Appendix A. Obviously, ijT  is 
monotonically increasing with the maritime distance. Theses values have been calculated in 
accordance with a usual methodology (Flood, 1954), assuming a fleet of standardized cryogenic 
vessels committed to shuttle on a given route ij  and include the main LNG specificities like 
evaporation losses during transport.  
LNG prices in importing regions 
The annual average LNG import prices 
jP  have been obtained by subtracting a regasification service 
fee12 to the local gas prices. A standardized fee of $0.50 per MMBtu has been uniformly assumed for 
all the importing countries (DTI, 2005). Concerning the natural gas prices observed in importing 
regions, we follow Mazighi (2003, p. 319) and assume that three macro regions can be distinguished – 
Asia, Europe and America – and that those prices are uniform within each area. This assumption is 
consistent with industrial reality as spatial price variations observed within these macro-zones are 
usually limited compared to those observed when considering these macro-zones. The gas price data 
used in this study are those labeled “Japan CIF”, “European Union CIF” and “US Henry Hub” in 
the BP Statistical Review (see Table 1). 
Table 1: key figures on LNG trade from GECF members 
Final Destination 2006 2007 2008 
Asia 
Volumes shipped from GECF members (Bcm) 115.44 126.56 134.34 
Reference Price (Japan CIF) ($/MMBtu)  7.14 7.73 12.55 
Europe 
Volumes shipped from GECF members (Bcm) 57.42 53.20 54.08 
Reference Price (EU CIF) ($/MMBtu) 8.69 8.93 12.61 
North 
America 
Volumes shipped from GECF members (Bcm) 18.47 25.09 14.27 
Reference Price (US Henry Hub) ($/MMBtu) 6.76 6.95 8.85 
Total Volumes shipped from GECF countries (Bcm) 191.33 204.85 202.69 
Reported trade flows 
The annual flows 
ijQ  are those reported by the consecutive editions of the BP Statistical Review.  
1.3 Preliminary remarks  
These assumptions prompt some remarks. Firstly, these assumptions allow us to present an aggregated 
vision of LNG trade originating from non-OECD exporters. Taking year 2007 as an example, Table 2 
provides an overall vision of the LNG value chain. That year, LNG trade generated a $57 billion 
                                                 
11 These extraction costs correspond solely to technical operations and include neither the effects of oil and gas taxation nor 
the opportunity cost related to the exhaustible nature of gas resources. 
12 Such a uniform rate insures that this cost element plays no role in the transportation model’s outcome. 
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revenue and the total costs amounted to $21 billion (enabling a nearly $35 billion rent). Shipping alone 
accounted for nearly one-third of these annual costs. Such a significant share justifies the attention 
paid to transportation issues in that industry. 
Table 2: The LNG value chain for GECF exporting countries (year 2007) 
  $ billion % 
E&P costs Production 3.588 16.6% 
LNG costs 
Liquefaction 7.234 33.4% 
Shipping 8.167 33.3% 
Re-gas 3.617 16.7% 
Total costs 21.638 100.0% 
Rent 34.870  
TOTAL revenue 57.476  
Secondly, only two factors motivate the differences in the unit costs of supplying LNG to a given 
destination: extraction cost variations and differences in the localizations. Because of the uniform rates 
used for both liquefaction and regasification, these activities do not in any way contribute to these unit 
cost differences and are thus assumed to play no direct role in the exporting decisions. An illustration 
of these points is given by ### Figure 1 to be inserted ### 
Figure 1 that presents a least-cost merit order for each of the main importing countries in North 
America, Europe and Asia. As expected, there are significant cost differences and the bulk of these 
variations is related to the distance factor. Moreover, no country has an absolute global cost advantage, 
which emphasizes that localization matters in the LNG industry. 
### Figure 1 to be inserted ### 
Figure 1 : Unit costs of imports of natural gas from GECF members ($/MMBtu) for three destinations: (A) the 
USA, (B) Spain, (C) Japan. 
2. Cooperation between LNG exporters 
In this section, the GECF's shipping rationalization decision to be taken for year t  is formulated as a 
simple static linear programming model. 
2.1 Formulation of the problem 
We focus on a given year t  and assume that exporting countries have total control over their LNG 
shipments. During that year, a homogeneous product, LNG, is to be shipped from n  shipping origins 
to d  destinations. The cost of shipping a unit amount from the i
th origin to the j th destination is 
known for all combinations  ,i j . For that particular year, the problem is to determine the quantities 
ijq  to be shipped over all routes so as to maximize the GECF’s collective profit.  
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In addition, GECF's shipment decisions are submitted to some constraints. As liquefaction projects 
require considerable investments, fund lenders usually submit their financial commitment to the 
presence of binding agreements for the supply of a predefined quantity of LNG. Therefore, we assume 
that a cooperative shipment policy must comply with those agreements, so that the overall volumes 
exported from any exporting country remain unchanged: ,i   
1 1
d d
ij ij
j j
q Q
 
  . 
The GECF aims at implementing a logistic rationalization without attempting to exert any collective 
market power, i.e. without any modification in prices 
jP . Hence, the GECF's decisions are supposed 
to leave unchanged the total volume of LNG received in each destination, i.e.: ,j   
1 1
n n
ij ij
i i
q Q
 
  .  
So, the annual profit obtained by i  is a linear function of iq :    
1
d
i i j i ij ij
j
q P C T q

   . For 
that particular year t , the GECF’s problem turns out to be a familiar transportation problem (Dantzig, 
1951) whose solution is denoted 
*q :  
Program 1: 
 
   
   
1
1 1
1 1
   
s.t.           1, 2,...,                     1
               1, 2,...,                    2
            0                    
ij
n
i i
q
i
d d
ij ij
j j
n n
ij ij
i i
ij
Max q
q Q i n
q Q j d
q


 
 
 
 


 
 
 
This program corresponds to a shipping cost minimization problem. It contains nd  non-negative 
variables 
ijq  
and n d  equality constraints of type (1) and (2). This problem is obviously feasible as, 
for any given year, the observed LNG flows 
ijQ  
satisfy all the constraints. Moreover, the optimal 
solution requires at most 1n d   routes with positive shipments (Dantzig, 1951). Whatever the year, 
a simple enumeration of the positive flows reported by the BP Statistical Review indicates a number of 
used routes always larger than 1n d  . Therefore, the observed LNG flows
 ij
Q
 
were suboptimal 
which leaves some room for a logistic optimization.  
At this stage, it may be important to underline that an annual perspective is used in this model. 
Obviously, this methodology could be extended to a different time frame. For example, an infra-
annual perspective might be considered to capture possible seasonal variations in trade patterns (in 
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terms of either LNG volumes or relative regional prices). Unfortunately, the lack of a consistent and 
exhaustive infra-annual data set at the world scale precluded that infra-annual analysis. As a result, we 
have to rely on the annual data reported by publicly available sources such as the BP Statistical 
Review. This situation means that we are implicitly assuming that the trade patterns remain constant 
throughout the year13.    
2.2 Results  
General comments 
Three optimal policies 
*q  have been independently computed for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008. 
According to the results displayed in Table 3, significant shipping cost savings could have been 
achieved thanks to a logistic cooperation.   
Table 3: Collective gain resulting from an annual shipping coordination (in M$) 
  2006 2007 2008 
Annual collective profit obtained with past flows    (a) 30 676.45 34 869.82 65 170.67    
Annual collective profit attained with an optimal shipping policy    (b) 31 422.65 35 838.12 66 157.88    
Shipping gains obtained from cooperation  (b)-(a) 746.20 968.31  987.21    
(as a % reduction in that year's shipping costs) 10.5% 11.9%  12.9% 
At the GECF level, this cooperation seems profitable. But, at an individual level, the annual gains 
   *i i i iq Q   displayed in Table 4 clearly show that cooperation could lead to a lowered 
profitability for Brunei, Indonesia, Qatar and Trinidad & Tobago. It will be shown below that 
implementing 
*q  induces significant variations in the individual's costs and revenues.  
Table 4: Impact of the optimal GECF shipping policies on the individual annual profits (in M$) 
  2006 2007 2008 
Trinidad & Tobago -182.29    -110.94 -539.85    
Oman  118.74    120.70  139.07    
Qatar -587.25    -624.88 -317.30    
UAE  319.28    341.05  337.98    
Algeria  273.71    511.31  226.87    
Egypt  743.44    704.03  320.21    
Equatorial Guinea  -      138.98  317.10    
Libya  0.71    0.75  0.53    
Nigeria  64.77    -115.04  477.26    
Brunei -3.86    -2.60 -3.26    
Indonesia -38.25    -37.88 -32.64    
Malaysia  37.20    42.82  61.24    
TOTAL  746.20    968.31  987.21    
                                                 
13 In fact, infra-annual variations in the relative market conditions of the various importing countries (quantities demanded, 
price levels) could possibly provide a justification for some of the seemingly irrational cross-shipments observed in the 
annual LNG trade data. Nevertheless, the inclusion of these infra-annual considerations in the GECF's problem would further 
narrow the shipping optimization possibilities, and, hence, the collective shipping gain that may be obtained by the GECF. In 
other words, this annual perspective provides an upper bound of the gains derived from a logistic coordination between LNG 
exporters.  
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Detailed comments 
A detailed analysis of the results obtained for a specific year also gives an interesting perspective. For 
the sake of brevity, that discussion is exclusively focused on 2007 but similar observations could also 
be presented for the other years.  
An optimal shipping policy for 2007 is displayed in Table 10 (See Appendix B). It comprises only 
2007 2007 1n d  =28 positive flows (compared to 77 in the observed flows 
2007
ijQ ). Figure 2 illustrates 
the shipment reallocations associated with that optimal policy: Mediterranean exporters reallocate 
most of their LNG to Europe, and Trinidad & Tobago readjusts its exports to neighboring North 
American markets, and the volumes liquefied in South East Asia remain dedicated to Asian 
destinations. For Asian exporters, the GECF’s optimization only fine-tunes exports at an intra-regional 
level.   
### Figure 2 to be inserted #### ### Figure 3 to be inserted ### 
Figure 2: Variations in the LNG destinations induced by 
the adoption of the GECF’s optimal policy for the year 
2007 (a positive value signals a shipment increase) 
Figure 3 : Gains in cost and revenues derived from the 
adoption of the optimal solution in 2007 (in M$) 
 
As that solution might be non-unique, it is unnecessary to comment extensively on these flows. 
Nevertheless, for an exporter i , implementing the optimal shipping policy
 
induces two effects: a 
variation in its revenues and a variation in its shipping costs. For 2007, that point is illustrated in 
Figure 3. For example, the shipping cost gains obtained by Trinidad & Tobago with 
*q  would not 
cover the associated revenue losses. For other countries (Qatar, Brunei and Indonesia), the situation 
would be even worse: with adverse variations in both costs and revenues. For these last three 
countries, participation in the GECF would not be rationale even if that group was to be organized so 
as to (i) keep individual revenues unchanged and (ii) minimize the shipping costs14...  
A first conclusion emerges from these results: a shipping rationalization may look desirable at a 
collective level but not at an individual one. This feature could seriously impede the spontaneous 
implementation of an optimized shipment policy as participation would not constitute a rational move 
for some countries. As it seems that substantial collective gains might be obtained from cooperation, 
cooperative game theory concepts could possibly pave the way to an incentive-compatible 
participation. This issue is studied in the next section. 
                                                 
14 In that case, 
*q  would still correspond to an optimal policy. Hence, these countries would still face adverse shipping cost 
variations...  
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3. An ‘incentive compatible’ gain sharing  
Supposing that the exporters agree to work together, we assume that the annual gain earned through 
the cooperation can be divided among the members of the coalition. To implement this reallocation of 
the benefits, we have to suppose that money has the properties of a "transferable utility” so that the 
problem at hand can be analyzed as a transferable utility game. This is a strong hypothesis, but looking 
at the industrial reality suggests the existence of side-payments among participants in a logistic 
cooperation15. The case where players cannot transfer the collective gains amongst themselves is 
discussed in section 4.4.  
3.1 A game theory background 
Context   
It is now time to introduce some notations. A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is 
a pair  ,N v , where  : 1,...,N n  is a finite set of players and : 2Nv R  is a function assigning 
to each coalition S N , its worth  v S . By convention,   0v   . Let S
 
be the number of 
elements of coalition S . To simplify the notations, when no ambiguity arises, we use i  to denote  i  
a particular element in N . 
In our particular case, we are considering the implementation of a logistic cooperation among GECF 
members during a given year: either 2006, 2007 or 2008. Here, three different (and independent) TU-
games are going to be successively studied:  ,t tN v , where tN  is the group of tn  potential 
participants in the GECF and the worth function tv  gives the maximum gain in annual profits that can 
collectively be attained by any coalition in year t . As these three TU-games are going to be studied 
independently, the subscript t  has been dropped to simplify the notations.  
For each coalition S , the gains  v S  to be apportioned among its members are measured by the 
difference between the maximum annual profits of its members when they all cooperate and when 
they don’t. Such a coordination policy is strictly limited to S  and thus has no impact on the shipments 
decided by the others \N S  countries. In other words,  v S  is simply the gain obtained from the 
creation of a smaller GECF-like organization that implements an optimal shipment policy specifically 
computed for coalition S . A simple adaptation of the previous linear programming model is sufficient 
to compute the value  v S  of each of the 2n  coalitions that can be formed in N . If we denote 
                                                 
15 In the 1990s, the Italian ENEL and the French GDF signed a swap deal under which Nigerian LNG is delivered in France 
and GDF diverts an equivalent volume of its imports to Italy. In fact, this swap agreement generated a logistic optimization 
and transfer prices were used as side-payments to create an incentive-compatible gain allocation. 
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 i S , the function whose value is equal to 1 if i S  and to 0 otherwise, these values  v S  can be 
obtained by solving the following problem:  
Program 2 
       
 
 
    
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1 1
1 1
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                                1, 2,...,  
                          1-   ,
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i i i i i
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i
d d
ij ij
j j
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ij ij
i i
i ij ij
v S Max S q Q
q Q i n
q Q j d
S q Q i j
  


 
 
   
 
 
 

 
 
    1,2,..., 1,2,...,
                          0     ij
n d
q


 
Obviously, the gains from cooperation are always positive. Moreover, this function is 0-normalized: 
  0v i  , i . On top of that, v  has a nice property: by construction, v   is super-additive since for all 
coalitions A , B  with A B  , we clearly have      v A B v A v B   . This feature suggests 
that countries have real incentives to cooperate since the union of any two disjoint groups of players 
can only improve their total gains. Thus, it should pay to cooperate in the largest coalition, and the 
problem may turn out to be the sharing of the overall annual gain among the n  countries.  
Formulation of a gain-sharing problem  
In this TU-game  ,N v , the redistribution problem faced by the GECF can be formulated as finding a 
vector x nR  where the i th coordinate named ix  is simply equal to the benefit allocated to country 
i . Here again, to simplify the notations, when no ambiguity arises, we use x  to denote  x v . It seems 
natural to expect that x  allows a full distribution of the gains created by the GECF. Equivalently, x  is 
expected to be efficient, that is to satisfy   
1
n
i
i
x v N

 . 
For the GECF, the goal of a redistribution policy is to encourage the cooperation of the twelve 
countries. Thus a reasonable test of the method is to check whether the participants agree in principle 
to the proposed allocation of benefits. A natural requirement for x  is to be individually rational; that 
is, for each i N ,  ix v i . This individual rationality condition basically states that no country 
should receive less in the joint operation proposed by the GECF than it would receive on its own. 
Finding an allocation which satisfies this property is fundamental since it constitutes the minimum 
incentive for an individual country to join the GECF. The set of all efficient and individually rational 
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allocations is named the imputation set  I v . Choosing an allocation in  I v
 
can be viewed as a 
minimal requirement for the GECF.  
A similar analysis can be extended to coalitions of countries as well as to individual exporters. The 
condition that no group receives less than the value it could generate on its own is the principle of 
group rationality. An allocation x  satisfies group rationality if there is no coalition S N  such that 
 i
i S
x v S

 . Group rationality obviously implies individual rationality. Now, the notion of the core 
(Gillies, 1953) can be introduced. Denote  C v  the core of a game  ,N v ; it is defined as the set of 
all efficient and group rational allocations, i.e., 
     
1
: :  and, for each ,
n
n
i i
i i S
C v x x v N S N x v S
 
 
     
 
 R . In this GECF case, selecting 
an allocation within the core constitutes an appealing requirement since it ensures that no participant, 
or subgroup of participants, can complain about the proposed distribution. In fact, each coalition 
prefers to cooperate within the grand coalition N  – and earns its share of the total gain – rather than 
choosing a ‘stand alone’ attitude that yields a lower gain.  
However, there is always the adverse possibility that there may be no core imputations: that is, no gain 
allocations that are group rational. Thus, we have to check whether the core of this gain-sharing game 
is void or not. In some cases, it can be relatively easy to show that the core is non-void. For example, 
in a convex game16, the core is always non-void. Unfortunately, the gain-sharing games that are under 
consideration here are generally not convex. An illustration of that non-convexity is given in Table 5.  
Table 5: An illustration of the non-convexity of the game  ,N v for the year 2007 (in M$) 
S   v S  
A := {Brunei, Indonesia} 9.445 
B := {Oman, UAE, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia} 50.100 
A B := {Oman, UAE, Equatorial Guinea, Brunei, Indonesia} 50.366 
A B := {Indonesia} 0 
Thus:   
 v A -  v A B   >   v A B -  v B  
9.445        >        0.266 
However, the super-additive nature of v  suggests that a large cooperation can be appealing. Thus, the 
existence of a non-void core has to be checked using a linear program as follows: 
Program 3 
                                                 
16 A TU-game  ,N v  is convex if for all coalitions A  and B  in N :          v A B v B v A v A B     .  
Roughly speaking, a game is convex if we have increasing returns to cooperation. In the TU-game framework this means that 
"the larger the coalition that an individual agent joins, the larger his marginal contribution."   (Moulin, 1991, p. 112).  
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A non-empty solution to this problem basically shows that a non-empty core exists since a positive 
value for   guarantees that it is possible to find at least one allocation nxR  that satisfies all the 
constraints attached to the definition of the core. Fortunately for the GECF, we found   equal to 
$536,082, $360,469 and $452,994 for the year 2006, 2007 and 2008 respectively). Moreover, the core 
is not reduced to a unique vector since we found that several 
nxR  provide this value for  .  
The core provides a preliminary criterion of a satisfactory allocation. Given that it is neither void nor 
reduced to a singleton, the core offers an attractive guideline for choosing an allocation since it 
narrows down the set of acceptable imputations. So, it is now time to verify whether some classic 
gain-sharing rules verify this requirement.  
3.2 Presentation of some gain-sharing methods 
Many gain-sharing methods can be envisaged for the GECF. In this article, we limit ourselves to a 
limited sample that includes most of the most popular ones. The first three rules propose to share the 
collective gain in proportion to the total of a given quantitative criteria. Those naïve rules could 
typically be inspired by some accounting considerations. A second type of rule is then presented; those 
two methods explicitly take into account the marginal contribution of each participant. Last but not 
least, four methods developed in game theory are presented.  
Method 1: Equal repartition of the total gain 
The annual shipping gain is basically divided into n  equal shares: 
 
,   i
v N
x i N
N
   .  
Method 2: Proportional to non-cooperative profits 
Here, the total annual gain  v N  is shared in proportion to the profits observed for that year:  
 
 
 
1
,   
i i
i n
i i
i
Q
x v N i N
Q



  

.  
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Method 3: Proportional to shipments 
Information on LNG shipped quantities is presented in numerous publicly available sources. In this 
third proportional rule, the total gain  v N  is simply shared in proportion to the total quantities 
shipped by each exporter during the year:  1
1 1
,   
d
ij
j
i n d
ij
i j
Q
x v N i N
Q

 
  


.  
Method 4: A marginal contribution scheme  
By definition, the marginal contribution im  
of a participant i  is the gain created by i  when joining 
the coalition of the  1n  other participants,    \v N v N i . It will be shown below that this 
method is not necessarily efficient (and thus does not belong to  I v ).  In the present case, it clearly 
overestimates the total gain to be shared  
1
n
i
i
m v N

 . 
Method 5: A scheme inspired by the Alternative Cost Avoided method (ACA-method)  
This method is inspired by a technique developed during the 1930s to allocate the joint costs of 
multipurpose water development projects (Tijs and Driessen, 1986). In this adaptation to a gain-
sharing problem, it can simply be viewed as a two-step procedure. In the first step, each player i  
receives a payment based on its marginal contribution im . But, for many value functions, the sum of 
these marginal contributions is greater than the total value created by the grand coalition. Therefore, a 
second step is needed to readjust the difference  
1
n
i
i
m v N

 .  In the ACA-method, this surplus is 
simply subtracted in proportion to   im v i , the differences between the i 's marginal value and its 
value in a stand alone case: 
 
 
  1
1
,   
n
i
i i i n
i
l
l
m v i
x m m v N i N
m v l

 
     
  


.  
As v  is a 0-normalized function, the surplus  
1
n
i
i
m v N

  is simply shared in proportion to the 
marginal values. 
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Method 6: The Shapley value  
The Shapley value is a well-known game theoretic allocation that has been defined as the unique 
allocation that satisfies a consistent set of three axioms (Shapley, 1953). An intuitive interpretation of 
the Shapley value can be presented as follows: as the grand coalition is formed by the sequential 
addition of exporters, each participant i  receives a benefit equal to the entire value     \v S v S i  
he offers to the coalition \S i  formed just before him. But the order in which the various exporters 
will join the grand coalition can be uncertain. The Shapley value is i 's expected benefit if all orders of 
formation of N  – the permutations of the grand coalition – are considered and intervene with the 
same probability 1/ !N  in the computation. It is defined as:  
    
\ ! \ !
\ ,   
!
i
S N
i S
S i N S
x v S v S i i N
N


    . 
The Shapley value has an attractive property since this allocation always belongs to the core of a 
convex game. Unfortunately, the results are not so clear-cut for super-additive games. For our 
particular instances of our GECF game, we will thus have to test if it belongs to the core.  
Method 7: The nucleolus  
Another game theoretical concept is the nucleolus proposed by Schmeidler (1969). He defined the 
unhappiness of a coalition S  with respect to a proposed allocation x  and proposed to measure it with 
   , i
i S
e S x v S x

  , the excess of the non-trivial coalitions    ,S N S N   with respect to 
an allocation x . This excess can simply be viewed as an index of that coalition's objections to the 
payoffs its members are receiving in the grand coalition. The coalition which objects most strongly to 
the proposed allocation x  is the one with the greatest excess. If this excess is positive, the proposed 
allocation is outside the core; if it is negative, the allocation is acceptable, but the coalition 
nevertheless has an interest in obtaining the smallest possible excess. Thus, it is appealing to look for 
an allocation that minimizes the maximum unhappiness. Schmeidler (1969) went one step ahead and 
proposed a new solution concept: the nucleolus of the game.  
Let       1 2 2,..., ne x e x e x  be a vector in 
2 2n
R  the components of which are the excess listed 
in a decreasing order, where S  runs over the subset of N  ,S N . Thus,  1e x  is the maximum 
unhappiness created by the proposed allocation x . Thanks to these vectors, two allocations 
- 19 - 
, ( )x y I v  can be compared: x  is preferred to y  if  e x  is lexicographically smaller17 than  e y , 
this is noted    Le x e y . Schmeidler (1969) named the nucleolus of the game the set 
          : ;  for all LNu v x I v e x e y y I v     and he proved that the nucleolus is a unique 
allocation. By construction, the nucleolus satisfies an appealing property: it always belongs to the core 
when it is non-empty. From a computational perspective, Kopelowitz (1967) proposed an algorithm 
for calculating the nucleolus by means of a sequence of linear programs. The computational procedure 
used here relies on Granot et al. (1998) and Boyer et al. (2006).  
Method 8: The "per capita" nucleolus 
The nucleolus is entirely based on a measure of the unhappiness of a coalition with respect to a 
proposed allocation. But there is some arbitrariness in the definition of the metric. This led Grotte 
(1970) to define a variant, named the per capita nucleolus (also named normalized nucleolus), which is 
based on a per capita measure of the excesses. In this allocation, the unhappiness of a coalition S  with 
respect to a proposed allocation x  is simply measured with  
 
,
i
i S
v S x
e S x
S




.  
 
Method 9: The disruption nucleolus 
This other variant of the nucleolus is due to Gately (1974) who, in a 3-person game, proposed an 
additional concept named "propensity to disrupt" a given allocation that was later extended to n-person 
games by Littlechild and Vaidya (1976). For a given allocation vector x , the propensity to disrupt, 
denoted  ,PD x S , of any coalition    ,S N S N  , is defined as the ratio of the total amount 
which the complementary coalition \N S  would lose if the grand coalition broke up, to the loss 
incurred by the coalition S  itself if that coalition refused to cooperate, i.e.: 
   
 
 
\
\
,
l
l N S
i
i S
x v N S
PD x S
x v S







 
Suppose that only strict core18 allocations are proposed to the members of the grand coalition N . It is 
clear that the propensity of a given subgroup S  to disrupt this grand coalition becomes larger when its 
payment becomes smaller (in such a case, the payment received by \N S  increases). It can even rise 
                                                 
17 It means that there are no index  1,..., 2 2nu   so that    u ue x e y  and    t te x e y  for all t u . 
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to infinity, reflecting an aspiration to quit the agreement, as the gain share of S  approaches its 
minimum  v S . Littlechild and Vaidya (1976) proposed using this ratio as a dissatisfaction measure 
to be minimized in a lexicographic sense. The resulting unique allocation is named disruption 
nucleolus. By construction, it also belongs to the strict core if it is non-empty. To compute that 
allocation, we rely on the computational procedure described in Littlechild and Vaidya (1976).  
4. Results 
In this section, we comment on the results obtained with these gain-sharing methods on three different 
TU-games:  2006 2006,N v ,  2007 2007,N v and  2008 2008,N v  for which the collective annual gain to be 
shared is equal to $746.20 million, $968.31 million and $987.21 million respectively. 
4.1 Preliminary comments 
The results obtained with these nine allocation methods are reported in Table 11 in Appendix C. To 
begin with, the marginal contribution scheme cannot be considered as a workable allocation 
mechanism as it is not an efficient rule for the GECF. Yet, this method provides an indication of the 
relative importance of the different actors. And there are large differences among them. Taking year 
2007 as an example, these marginal contributions vary from a limited $0.7 million for Brunei to $459 
million for Qatar – more than 47% of the total annual gains. Those differences obviously depend on 
factors such as pre-cooperation export policies or costs differences. Anyway, these results suggest that 
Qatar’s participation is very important for the whole cooperation and should thus be appropriately 
rewarded.  
Whatever the year considered, proportional methods differ significantly from the others. These 
differences are noteworthy for Qatar and South East Asian exporters (Brunei, Indonesia and 
Malaysia). With proportional methods, Qatar’s share is not that different from those received by other 
exporters, which is somehow astonishing given the presupposed importance of Qatar for the grand 
coalition (because of its marginal contributions). By contrast, these allocations provide large gains to 
South East Asian exporters. The three "lexicography inspired" methods all provide equivalent rankings 
of the shares to be earned in a given year. In the 2007 example, Qatar would have received the largest 
share, followed by Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, Trinidad & Tobago, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, UAE, 
Equatorial Guinea, Libya and Brunei. Moreover, the nucleolus and the per capita nucleolus schemes 
provide similar numerical results. 
                                                                                                                                                        
18 The strict core is defined as      : , ,  and i i
i S i N
x C v x v S S N S x v N
 
 
     
 
  . 
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4.2 Checking the method’s properties 
Group rationality 
Excepted for the marginal contribution, all these allocation methods are elements of the imputation set 
 I v  and individual exporters thus have an incentive to join the cooperation. But do those allocations 
provide an incentive to cooperate for each of the other  2 2n n   non-trivial and non individual 
subgroups that could be formed in N ? By construction, this verification is obviously not required for 
the nucleolus-inspired allocations since the cores of these three games are non-empty. 
For some other methods, a simple observation of the allocation results listed in
 
Table 11 can be 
sufficient to prove that some methods do not belong to the core. With proportional schemes, the share 
allocated to some individual participants i  like Oman, Libya, Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia would 
be too large since it would exceed i 's marginal contributions im . Reframed in a cross-subsidy's 
context (Faulhaber, 1975), it simply means that those allocations would "unduly" favor these 
individual exporters i  at the expense of those involved in the complementary coalitions \N i .  Each 
of those complementary coalitions \N i  could thus rightly prefer to stay away from any GECF 
agreement based on these proportional schemes.   
According to the results of a complete enumeration presented in Table 6, a similar line of arguments 
could also be proposed for numerous non-trivial coalitions. Compared to the proportional methods, both 
the Shapley value and the ACA method appear somewhat more appropriate since the number of 
"unhappy" coalitions is reduced. For 2006, we even found that an ACA allocation belongs to the core 
of a year's game. But, these two gain-sharing schemes can not provide a mechanism that would be 
unanimously accepted whatever the year considered.  
Table 6: Results of core belonging tests. ‘Yes’ indicates core belonging. 
The numbers of coalitions likely to refuse the GECF agreement, if any, are given in italics. 
 
Equal 
Repartition 
Proportional 
to profits 
Proportional 
to quantities 
« ACA » 
method 
Shapley 
Value 
2006 
No No No Yes No 
358 332 351 0 18 
2007 
No No No No No 
981 756 748 2 52 
2008 
No No No No No 
1354 1095 1079 37 105 
Therefore, among the methods studied in this article, only three: the nucleolus, the per capita nucleolus 
and the disruption nucleolus, systematically provide an incentive-compatible gain allocation. But can 
we go further and find a criterion that could be used to discriminate one method among the three 
remaining ones? 
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Aggregate-monotonicity  
Following Young et al. (1980), we can note that the allocation method is usually chosen before the 
cooperation has been started, at a time when the total gains obtained from cooperation are yet to be 
earned and can only be estimated. As a consequence, it is not unrealistic to imagine that each potential 
participant in the GECF will actively consider various gain scenarios and check allocation outcomes 
before committing to the GECF. As a result, it would not be surprising to observe that participants 
collectively require the allocation method to satisfy an elementary monotony property named 
aggregate-monotonicity property (Megiddo, 1974). Denote  x v  - respectively  x v  - the outcome 
of a given allocation method computed for the game  ,N v  - respectively  ,N v . An allocation 
nxR  is monotonic in the aggregate if (Young, 1985, p.17) for all v , v and N :   
       
   
  and    for all 
implies   for all i i
v N v N v S v S S N
x v x v i N

  
 
 
For the GECF case, aggregate-monotonicity is desirable since it basically assures the participants, 
after committing themselves to an allocation, that if the total gain was to decrease then no participant 
would receive more; conversely, if total gain increases, no individual payments will decrease.   
Unfortunately, this desirable property is not always satisfied. For the nucleolus, this is a well-known 
result that was formally established by Megiddo (1974). On the contrary, the per capita nucleolus rule 
is always monotonic in the aggregate (Young et al., 1980). Regarding the disruption nucleolus, a 
simple numerical test provides some valuable information. For example, we consider the year 200819 
and assume that the total gain of the grand coalition N  is slightly decreased by $0.5 million, a figure 
that is compatible with a non-empty core for the game  ,N v . The three nucleolus methods have 
been successively computed for that game and the results are reported in Table 7. A simple 
comparison with previous results presented in Table 11 confirms that the disruption nucleolus is not 
monotonic in the aggregate (cf. Qatar's allocations).  
As a result, considering both core belonging and monotonicity in the aggregate significantly narrows 
the set of possible allocations for the GECF. Among the methods considered in this article, the per 
capita nucleolus is the only one that verifies both requirements... In the next subsection, we thus 
assume that the per capita nucleolus is selected and implemented. 
 
                                                 
19 As similar results have also been obtained with the years 2006 and 2007, we have chosen to report only 2008 figures for 
the sake of brevity. 
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Table 7: Allocation results for the year 2008 with a $0.5 million reduction in the total gain (in M$).  
 
Nucleolus 
Per 
Capita 
Nucleolus 
Disruption 
Nucleolus 
Trinidad & Tobago  131.529     128.551     129.176    
Oman  17.206     16.775     18.749    
Qatar  439.122     447.762     401.588    
UAE  5.441     4.343     7.113    
Algeria  101.306     97.619     108.507    
Egypt  159.117     168.460     167.875    
Equatorial Guinea  24.708     21.265     30.788    
Libya  0.807     0.220     1.358    
Nigeria  66.212     63.643     77.806    
Brunei  0.203     0.034     0.342    
Indonesia  20.327     19.229     20.813    
Malaysia  20.729     18.809     22.594    
TOTAL  986.708     986.708     986.708    
4.3 Dealing with a costly coordination  
In the previous subsection, we have assumed that coordination can be organized at a zero cost so that 
there is a complete redistribution of the gains earned thanks to the GECF. However, it is highly likely 
that such a cooperation will induce a coordination cost. In the oil industry, OPEC's coordination 
requires a General Secretariat based in Vienna whose cost is possibly limited but obviously not equal 
to zero. As far as the GECF is concerned, the creation of a dedicated Liaison Office to be located in 
Qatar is considered (Hallouche, 2006). Moreover the formulation of a logistic model, the gathering of 
the data, and the numerical analysis are time-consuming and possibly expensive activities. If the 
coordination becomes a costly activity, two questions arise. Firstly, how does the existence of an 
annual coordination cost denoted 0   influence the gain-sharing outcome? Secondly, what is the 
maximum amount, denoted  , that can be tolerated by the participants without calling into question 
the advantages of cooperation via the GECF?  
Incidence on the gain-sharing outcome 
Regarding the impact on the per capita nucleolus outcome, the demonstration in Young et al. (1980) 
provides a nice answer. If we assume that a costly GECF can be described by the game  ,N v  with a 
reference to the zero-cost case  ,N v  so that v  is defined as:    v N v N    and 
   v S v S for all S N

 , the per capita nucleolus  x v  of the game  ,N v  can also be described 
from those of game  ,N v . In the costly case, each country i  receives    i ix v x v
n

  , which 
corresponds to an equal repartition of the coordination costs. In passing, we can note that applying an 
OPEC-inspired institutional organization to the GECF is an issue frequently raised by GECF observers 
and it is interesting to see that this coordination cost sharing rule is precisely the one used by the 
OPEC (OPEC Statute, 2008, art. 37, p.21).   
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The maximum coordination cost 
The second question can be reframed as finding the maximum   compatible with a non-empty core 
for the game  ,N v . Again, solving a simple linear programming problem provides the answer: 
Program n°4 
 
   
 
,
1
     
          s.t.        
                         ,  
                      0 ,   0 ,        1,2,...,
ix
n
i
i
i
i S
i
Max
x v N
x v S S N S N
x i n

 





 
  
  


 
With previous assumptions, we found some particularly low values for  : $1.072 million for the year 
2006, $0.721 million for the year 2007 and $0.905 million for 2008. Any greater amount can be 
considered as unsustainable because it corresponds to an empty core situation.  
By construction, with
 
  , there is at least one coalition 'S N  for which any allocation x  in the 
core of  ,N v  satisfies  
'
'i
i S
x v S

 . Such a coalition 'S  has thus an infinite propensity to disrupt 
and is perfectly indifferent between (1) cooperating within the GECF (and hence contributing to  ) or 
(2) staying on its own. Obviously, this remark suggests that a zero coordination cost has been 
implicitly assumed for any subgroup ,S N S N  . Hence, we are supposing that 'S  is able to earn 
 'v S  without incurring any coordination costs even if the cardinality 'S  is large. It means that the 
coordination cost  Cc S of a given subgroup S N  is equal to   if  S N  and to zero when 
   ,S N S N  . An assumption of the amount of coordination costs incurred by S  as a function 
of S  could certainly be needed to get a more realistic representation. As a result, we have tested 
various functional forms for these coordination costs but our results remain consistent with the 
conclusion that the GECF cannot afford large coordination costs20. 
Obviously, the coordination of these exportation policies can be a complex task. Given the very low 
figures found for  , it is clear that even a limited coordination cost can be enough to lead to an empty 
core situation. In this unfortunate situation, whatever the proposed gain-sharing method, there is 
always at least one coalition that can rightly protest against the allocation outcome.  
                                                 
20 For example, in the 2007 game, the maximum cost   remains as low as $4.153 million with a quadratic cost like 
   
2
. 1Cc S S   where  
2
1n    for   S N S  . 
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4.4 Further discussion: a cooperation without money transfers? 
Given that a gain redistribution policy may be difficult to agree upon, it may be worthwhile to 
consider a case where players cannot transfer these gains amongst themselves21. That subsection offers 
some preliminary insights in that direction.  
In fact, a simple adaptation of the previous framework is sufficient to assess the maximum collective 
gain that could be achieved by an incentive-compatible cooperation without any money transfers. That 
assessment has been obtained by adding n  participation constraints to “Program 1”: 
   i i i iq Q  , i . As expected, the inclusion of these additional constraints further reduces the 
annual collective gain: -33% in 2006, -25% in 2007 and -16% in 2008 (cf. Table 8). Moreover, some 
countries (e.g.: Trinidad & Tobago, Qatar, Nigeria...) derive no individual gain from their participation 
to N  and thus remain indifferent between a stand alone attitude and a cooperation within the grand 
coalition.  
Table 8: Impact of the optimal GECF shipping policies on the individual annual profits (in M$) 
  2006 2007 2008 
Trinidad & Tobago 0 0      0      
Oman 0       16.91     21.07    
Qatar 0 0  0      
UAE 0      0       95.09    
Algeria  28.55     322.44     226.87    
Egypt  443.75     344.88     320.21    
Equatorial Guinea  -       14.31     118.79    
Libya  0.71     0.75     0.53    
Nigeria 0 0 0 
Brunei 0      0 0 
Indonesia 0 0       0      
Malaysia  24.42     26.75     44.66    
TOTAL   497.43     726.05     827.22    
At this stage, it may be worthwhile analyzing whether some exporters may be willing to block, or not, 
the creation of that large cooperation. For a given coalition S N , comparing the individual gain 
improvements proposed by S  with those proposed in Table 8 provides a useful indication on the 
attitude of S  toward the grand cooperation. Any coalition S  able to provide individual gains  iv S  
to its members i  that are all strictly larger than their counterpart  iv N  proposed by the grand 
coalition is said to block N . Evidently, all the exporters involved in such a coalition S  would 
unanimously prefer to cooperate within S  than within N . 
Using Program 2, it is easy to compute the optimal shipping policy for each of the non-trivial 
subgroups in N . Among them, we have identified numerous coalitions whose optimal shipment 
policy would both (i) provide strictly positive individual gains to each member (i.e. the individual 
                                                 
21 We thank an anonymous referee for having drawn our attention on the questions discussed in this subsection. 
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rationality constraints are not binding and no money transfer are required to obtain the individual 
participation of the members) and (ii) involve countries who all obtain a strictly larger individual gain 
than those proposed by the grand coalition (hence, members unanimously prefer to organize 
themselves into groups rather than cooperate within a group). Among these coalitions, there are 
obvious ones. For example in 2008, a simple bilateral cooperation between Trinidad & Tobago and 
Qatar could have provided them with $76.85 million and $57.74 million respectively. Comparing 
these figures with the zero individual gains proposed in Table 8 clearly demonstrates that blocking the 
creation of the grand coalition would be a rational decision for these two countries. 
Furthermore, we have also tried alternative arrangements for the grand coalition and have still found 
that implementing a large cooperation within N  without side payments is a difficult task. For 
example, we have considered the case of a cooperation designed to maximize, in a lexicographic 
order, the individual gain of each member. Our goal was to provide strictly positive gains for every 
member without implementing any side payment. Of course, such a compromise also leads to a further 
reduction in the total collective gain to $311.71 million, $427.89 million and $528.62 million for 2006, 
2007 and 2008 respectively. Unfortunately, we found that this compromise remains insufficient to 
prevent some subgroups from blocking the creation of the large coalition. Again, our 2008 example 
provides a clear illustration as Qatar and Trinidad & Tobago would continue to unanimously prefer 
their bilateral agreement to the grand cooperation (as that latter cooperation would only provide them 
an individual $49.70 million gain in profit). 
Further research involving the formulation of a cooperative game with non-transferable utility (NTU-
game) could be required to discuss the feasibility of a large shipping cooperation that involves no 
money transfers. This is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, these preliminary insights 
suggest that the creation of such an organization would face large complexities.  
Conclusions 
Since the mid-2000s we are seeing heightened concern about the future of the GECF and the possible 
emergence of a cartel in the gas industry. As a consequence, many authors have proposed a detailed 
description of the GECF. Apart from rare exceptions, most of those contributions present a strict 
geopolitical approach and lack a clear economic analysis. This paper attempts to illustrate how some 
quantitative techniques can be used to address an important issue: What behavior will the GECF adopt 
in the future? 
Many industrial observers share an idealized view of how cooperation among LNG exporters could be 
entirely devoted to the promotion of a purely logistic cooperation. In most cases, there is no room for 
market power issues in those mental constructions. This paper investigates the rationale of that 
argument. We thus adopted this strong behavioral assumption and supposed that the GECF’s objective 
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can be reframed as the identification of optimum routes and schedules for a fleet of vessels carrying 
participants’ LNG throughout the world by means of a simple transportation model. In this particular 
instance of a transportation problem, cooperation is found to be collectively profitable since there is a 
potential for a reduction of the lengths of actual supply chains. But, results also indicate that some 
countries could rationally prefer to stay away from the GECF unless a redistribution mechanism could 
be implemented. Thanks to a cooperative game theory framework, we show that the logistic 
cooperation at hand corresponds to a super-additive TU-game whose core is non-empty. Several 
classic allocation concepts (basic sharing methods, the Shapley value and nucleolus-inspired methods) 
have been implemented and analyzed in the light of two desirable axiomatic properties. Firstly, core 
belonging is considered as an imperative prerequisite since it eliminates possible contestation to the 
proposed redistribution scheme. Then, aggregate-monotonicity is checked in order to promote the 
methods that are able to adapt to changing conditions of the total value to be shared. Out of the 
methods studied, only one - the per capita nucleolus – satisfies both criterions. Thus, the range of 
conceivable methods appears significantly narrower than expected. Moreover, this nucleolus-inspired 
method is somehow complicated and requires detailed information on costs, distances... From a strict 
practical perspective, some doubts can be raised on the capability of the GECF to implement such a 
non-trivial allocation. Lastly, coordination costs were considered. Our results indicate that a limited 
amount of coordination costs could be sufficient to deny the possibility of finding a core-belonging 
allocation of the gains, thus creating some incentive for a split up of the grand coalition. According to 
these results, it seems that a reductio ad absurdum has been reached which makes us think that the 
assumption of a rationalization-motivated cooperation must be reconsidered.  
Further research is thus needed to analyze the GECF. Regarding the perspective used in this article, 
several improvements could be considered to strengthen the validity of that result (e.g. a dynamic 
framework, the probable upcoming entry of large LNG exporters such as Russia, Iran and 
Venezuela...). Of course, upcoming research should also consider an alternative behavioral assumption 
for the GECF: that of a cartel that collectively seeks to exert some market power.   
Acknowledgement 
The first author is heavily indebted to Michel Le Breton for his brilliant presentation of cooperative 
game theory. Many people have provided helpful comments and suggestions on the analysis, and we 
are pleased to take this opportunity to thank them. We are especially grateful to Albert Banal-Estanol, 
Aymeric Lardon, Michel Le Breton, Jacques Percebois and one anonymous referee for helpful 
comments and suggestions. Thanks are also due to Gaelle Barrot, Laurent David, Joanne Evans, 
Dermot Gately, Axel Pierru, and Philippe Solal. All remaining errors are ours. The views expressed 
herein are strictly those of the authors and are not to be construed as representing those of the IFP.  
- 28 - 
References 
Boots, M.G., Rijkers, F.A.M., Hobbs, B.F., 2004. Trading in the downstream European gas market: a 
successive oligopoly approach. The Energy Journal 25 (3), 73–102. 
BP, 2008. BP Statistical Review of World Energy. BP, London. 
Boyer, M., Moreaux, M., Truchon, M., Partage des coûts et tarification des infrastructures, 
Monographie CIRANO 2006MO-01, Mars 2006, CIRANO, Montréal. 
Brito D.L, Hartley P.R., 2007. Expectations and the Evolving World Gas Market, The Energy Journal 
28 (1), 1–24. 
Brown S., Yücel M., 2009. Market Arbitrage: European and North American Natural Gas Prices. The 
Energy Journal Special issue: World Natural Gas Markets and Trade: A Multi-Modelling Perspective, 
167-185.  
Cremer J., Weitzman M., 1976. OPEC and the Monopoly Price of World Oil. European Economic 
Review 8 (2), 155-164. 
Dantzig, G. B. 1951. Application of the simplex method to a transportation problem. In Koopmans, T. 
C. (ed.), Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, John Wiley& Sons: NY; 1951. 359-373.  
DTI, 2005. UK Capability in the LNG Global Market. Department of Trade and Industry, Energy 
Technologies and Industries Unit. London. 
Egging R., Gabriel S.A., Holz F., Zhuang J., 2008. A complementarity model for the European natural 
gas market. Energy Policy 36 (7), 2385-2414. 
EMF (Energy Modeling Forum), 2007. Prices and Trade in a Globalizing Natural Gas Market, EMF 
Report 23, July 2007. Stanford University. Stanford.  
Engevall S., Göthe-Lundgren M., Värbrand P., 1998. The traveling salesman game: An application of 
cost allocation in a gas and oil company. Annals of Operations Research 82 (1), 453-472. 
Faulhaber G.R., 1975. Cross-subsidization: pricing in public enterprises. American Economic Review 
65 (5), 966-977. 
Finon D., 2007. Russia and the "Gas-OPEC". Real or Perceived Threat? IFRI Russia/NIS Center, 
Paris. 
Flood M. M., 1954. Application of Transportation Theory to Scheduling a Military Tanker Fleet. 
Journal of the Operations Research Society of America (2), 150-162. 
- 29 - 
Gately D., 1974. Sharing the games from regional cooperation: a game theoretic application to 
planning investment in electric power. International Economic Review 15 (1), 195-208. 
GIIGNL, 2008. The LNG Industry. GIIGNL, Paris. 
Gillies, D.B., 1953. Some theorems on n-Person games. Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton. 
Golombek R., Gjelsvik E., Rosendahl K.E., 1995. Effects of liberalizing the natural gas markets in 
Western Europe. The Energy Journal 16 (1), 85–111. 
Granot, D., F. Granot, Zhu W.R., 1998. On Characterization Sets for the Nucleolus, International 
Journal of Game Theory 27, 359-374. 
Greaker M, Sagen E., 2008. Explaining experience curves for new energy technologies: A case study 
of liquefied natural gas. Energy Economics 30, 2899–2911 
Grotte, J.H., 1970. Computation of and Observations on the Nucleolus, and the Central Games. M.Sc. 
Thesis, Cornell University. 
Hallouche H., 2006. The Gas Exporting Countries Forum: Is it really a Gas OPEC in the Making, 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 13, Oxford.  
Hartley P., Medlock. K.B., 2006. Political and economic influences on the future world market for 
natural gas. In Victor, D.G., Jaffe, A.M., Hayes, M. H. (Eds), Natural Gas and Geopolitics: From 1970 
to 2040, chapter 12, Cambridge University Press; 2006. 
Holz F., Hirschhausen C.v., Kemfert C., 2008. A Strategic Model of European Gas Supply 
(GASMOD), Energy Economics 30 (3), 766–788. 
Huntington H. G. (ed.), 2009. World Natural Gas Markets and Trade: A Multi-Modelling Perspective, 
The Energy Journal, Special issue.  
Jaffe A.M., Soligo R. 2006. Market Structure in the New Gas Economy: Is Cartelization Possible? In 
Victor, D.G., Jaffe, A.M., Hayes, M. H. (Eds), Natural Gas and Geopolitics: From 1970 to 2040, 
chapter 11, Cambridge University Press; 2006. 
Jensen J.T., 2003. The LNG revolution. The Energy Journal 24 (2), 14-58. 
Jensen, J.T. The Development of a Global LNG Market. Is it Likely? If so When?, Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies, London; 2004.  
Kantorovich L. V., 1960. Mathematical Methods of Organizing and Planning Production. 
Management Science 6 (4), 366-422.  
- 30 - 
Kattuman P.A., Green R.J., Bialek J.W., 2004. Allocating electricity transmission costs through 
tracing: a game-theoretic rationale. Operations Research Letters 32 (2), 114-120. 
Koopmans T., 1949. Optimum Utilization of the Transportation System. Econometrica 17, 136-145.  
Kopelowitz A., 1967. Computation of the kernels of simple games and the nucleolus of n-person 
games. RM-131, Mathematics Department, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. 
Littlechild S.C., Vaidya K.G., 1976. The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a 
characteristic function game. International Journal of Game Theory 5 (2-3), pp. 151–161. 
Mandil C., 2008. "Bientôt une OPEP du gaz" Interview by Challenges magazine 22nd September 2008; 
http://www.challenges.fr/actualites/finance_et_marches/20080922.CHA6616/bientot_une_opep_du_g
az_.html  
Mathiesen L., Roland K., Thonstad K., 1987. The European Natural Gas Market. Degrees of Market 
Power on the Selling Side. In Golombek and Hoel (eds.), Natural Gas Markets and Contracts, North 
Holland Publ. Co., Amsterdam, 1987. 
Mazighi A. E. H., 2003. An examination of the international natural gas trade, OPEC Review 27 (4), 
313-329. 
Moulin H. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making: Monograph of the Econometric Society, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; 1991. 
Megiddo N., 1974. On the nonmonotonicity of the bargaining set, the kernel, and the nucleolus of a 
game. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics 27 (2), 355-358. 
Neumann A., 2009. Linking Natural Gas Markets – Is LNG Doing its Job? The Energy Journal 
Special issue: World Natural Gas Markets and Trade: A Multi-Modelling Perspective, 187-199.  
OME. Assessment of Internal and External Gas Supply Options for the EU - Evaluation of the Supply 
Costs of New Natural Gas Supply Projects to the EU and an Investigation of Related Financial 
Requirements and Tools. Observatoire Méditerranéen de l'Energie: Sophia-Antipolis; 2001. 
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). OPEC Statute 2008, OPEC Secretariat: 
Vienna; 2008. 
Percebois J.  L'économie de l'énergie, Editions Economica: Paris; 1989.  
Percebois J., 2008. The supply of natural gas in the European Union—strategic issues, OPEC Energy 
Review 32 (1), 33-53 
- 31 - 
Pierru A., 2007. Allocating the CO2 emissions of an oil refinery with Aumann–Shapley prices. Energy 
Economics 29 (3), 563-577. 
Rosendahl K.E.and E. L. Sagen, 2009. The Global Natural Gas Market: Will Transport Cost 
Reductions Lead to Lower Prices? The Energy Journal 30 (2), 17-40. 
Schmeidler D., 1969. The nucleolus of a characteristic function game. SIAM Journal on applied 
mathematics 17, 1163-1170. 
Shapley, L.S., 1953. A Value for n-Person Games. In Kuhn, H.W. and Tucker, A.W. (eds.) 
Contributions to the Theory of Games, n. II, Annals of Math. Studies, 28. Princeton University Press; 
1953. pp. 307-317. 
Tijs S. H., Driessen T. S. H., 1986. Game Theory and Cost Allocation Problems, Management Science 
32 (8), 1015-1028. 
Tönjes C., de Jong J. Perspectives on security of supply in European natural gas markets, CIEP, 
Clingendael Institute: The Hague; 2007. 
Wagbara O.N., 2007. How would the gas exporting countries forum influence gas trade? Energy 
Policy 35(2), 1224-1237. 
Wolak F.A., Kolstad C.D., 1988. Measuring Relative Market Power in the Western U.S. Coal Market 
Using Shapley Values. Resources and Energy 10 (4), 293-314. 
Yepes Rodríguez R., 2008. Real option valuation of free destination in long-term liquefied natural gas 
supplies. Energy Economics 30 (4), 1909-1932. 
Yergin D., Stoppard M., 2003. The next prize. Foreign Affairs 82 (6), 103-114. 
Young H.P., Okada N., Hashimoto T., 1980. Cost Allocation in Water Resources Development. A 
Case Study of Sweden. IIASA Research report, Laxenburg. 
Young H.P., 1985. Methods and principles of cost allocation. In. H. Young. (Ed.) Cost Allocation: 
Method, principles, applications. North-Holland: Amsterdam; 1985. 
Zhuravleva P., 2009. The Nature of LNG Arbitrage: an Analysis of the Main Barriers to the Growth of 
the Global LNG Arbitrage Market, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 31, Oxford. 
- 32 - 
Appendix A. Costs assumptions  
Table 9: Unit costs used in that study ($/1000m3)* 
 
Gas 
extraction 
and 
liquefaction 
costs 
iC  
($/1000m3) * 
Unit shipping costs ijT  
for LNG  ($/1000m3) ** 
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Trinidad & Tobago        21.19    25.24 29.76 15.29 16.33 44.89 43.59 57.23 48.6 40.47 40.61 61.62 44.41 82.32 86.29 90.77 95.82 102.59 
Oman        14.13    77.87 90.67 74.59 73.41 62.32 46.77 31.21 45.49 50.31 47.67 30.82 63.69 47.24 16.64 63.99 57.05 51.81 
Qatar        10.59    95.4 108.36 92.08 90.89 65.65 50.34 35.88 49.07 56.86 51.47 35.49 67.02 53.11 20.61 64.78 62.96 54.63 
UAE        12.36    94.88 107.84 91.56 90.37 65.54 49.95 35.35 48.67 56.75 50.94 34.97 66.92 54.21 20.29 65.91 64.08 55.73 
Algeria        15.89    42.52 54.98 39.33 38.18 23.69 13.59 18.15 14.08 15.18 11.09 22.4 24.79 83.27 52.44 91.71 93.66 84.9 
Egypt        21.19    56.92 69.54 53.68 52.52 38.47 22.99 15.11 22.32 29.84 23.48 15.67 38.95 68.02 39.32 81.2 78.31 71.49 
Equatorial Guinea        17.66    58.48 67.52 52.72 50.9 49.69 46.04 59.46 47.83 41 40.48 60.19 50.18 95.95 73.84 108.04 104.25 97.42 
Libya        17.66    52.72 65.33 49.57 48.35 33.8 19.57 19.79 18.55 25.21 19.55 20.27 34.91 74.89 43.92 88.51 85.22 77.59 
Nigeria        17.66    56.59 65.63 51.38 49.92 49.06 45.41 54.4 47.2 40.37 39.85 55.14 49.55 94.35 73.3 106.28 103.95 95.39 
Brunei        14.19    110.02 123.13 106.65 105.44 81 65.21 50.43 63.92 72.09 65.54 50.04 82.39 23.14 28.46 31 27.68 27.86 
Indonesia          8.97    123.39 136.61 120 118.78 94.13 78.16 63.31 76.91 85.15 78.54 62.91 95.53 23.18 41.02 29.09 27.61 22.44 
Malaysia        35.47    120.83 134.16 117.42 116.19 91.36 75.32 60.31 74.01 82.32 75.66 59.91 92.77 24.41 37.99 30.21 25.96 23.08 
Sources:   * OME (2001) and calculations by the authors based on various sources (DTI, 2005; GIIGNL, 2008)22. 
 
Appendix B.  Numerical results for the year 2007  
Table 10: Optimized LNG trade movements from GECF countries for year 2007 (Bcm) 
to North America Europe Asia 
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Trinidad & Tobago 14.88 2.17 0.36 0.74 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 18.15 
Oman - - - - - - - - - - - - .57 2.43 - 9.16 - 12.16 
Qatar - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.9 - 10.59 38.49 
UAE - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7.55 - - - 7.55 
Algeria - - - - - 9.26 - - - 15.41 - - - - - - - 24.67 
Egypt - - - - - 3.64 0.81 1.67 - - 6.01 - - - 1.48 - - 13.61 
Equatorial Guinea - - - - - - - - - 1.42 - - - - - - - 1.42 
Libya - - - - - - - 0.76 - - - - - - - - - 0.76 
Nigeria 6.94 - - - 3.17 - - - 2.31 7.28 - 1.46 - - - - - 21.16 
Brunei - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9.35 - - 9.35 
Indonesia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.74 - - 27.74 
Malaysia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5.12 24.67 - 29.79 
Total imports 21.82 2.17 0.36 0.74 3.17 12.9 0.81 2.43 2.31 24.11 6.01 1.46 0.57 9.98 71.59 33.83 10.59 204.85 
                                                 
22 A technical appendix, available from authors upon request, provides a complete presentation of the methodology and the numerical assumptions used in that study. 
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Appendix C. Results 
 
Table 11: Annual gain allocation by nine methods computed for each of the three annual games (M$) 
 
Marginal 
Contribution  
Equal 
Repartition 
Proportional 
to profits 
Proportional 
to quantities 
« ACA »  
method 
Shapley 
Value 
Nucleolus 
Per 
Capita 
Nucleolus 
Disruption 
Nucleolus 
2
0
0
6
 
Trinidad & Tobago 149.437 67.836 59.628 63.376 106.468 103.66 99.962 97.129 108.619 
Oman 21.29 67.836 37.285 45.007 15.168 31.027 14.922 14.755 15.964 
Qatar 235.713 67.836 110.288 121.253 167.937 148.864 166.697 175.454 163.237 
UAE 8.212 67.836 20.903 27.612 5.851 7.944 4.09 2.082 5.753 
Algeria 187.465 67.836 130.867 96.254 133.563 128.086 123.15 127.206 134.177 
Egypt 264.719 67.836 60.136 58.384 188.604 178.194 205.707 204.46 190.353 
Libya 2.036 67.836 3.843 2.808 1.451 2.491 1.018 0.258 1.068 
Nigeria 103.235 67.836 77.027 68.563 73.552 90.86 77.706 73.933 75.167 
Brunei 1.072 67.836 36.825 38.26 0.764 3.738 0.536 0.097 0.782 
Indonesia 33.493 67.836 116.78 115.325 23.863 22.662 28.108 27.363 25.041 
Malaysia 40.676 67.836 92.618 109.358 28.98 28.673 24.305 23.462 26.037 
TOTAL 1047.348 746.2 746.2 746.2 746.2 746.2 746.2 746.2 746.2 
2
0
0
7
 
Trinidad & Tobago 123.695 80.692 76.695 85.793 94.130 117.062 81.577 78.334 93.630 
Oman 20.253 80.692 49.784 57.479 15.413 20.445 17.195 16.868 16.541 
Qatar 459.779 80.692 174.921 181.938 349.885 289.67 386.845 398.619 351.103 
UAE 8.386 80.692 29.809 35.688 6.382 8.332 5.306 5.000 6.832 
Algeria 205.191 80.692 146.34 116.613 156.147 161.099 144.886 144.776 155.629 
Egypt 245.722 80.692 60.172 64.333 186.991 174.970 188.052 185.307 187.873 
Equatorial Guinea 6.663 80.692 4.190 6.712 5.071 20.568 3.604 3.277 5.442 
Libya 2.149 80.692 4.750 3.592 1.636 3.051 1.075 0.280 0.922 
Nigeria 134.774 80.692 105.591 100.021 102.561 121.775 92.220 89.413 102.845 
Brunei 0.721 80.692 45.461 44.197 0.549 3.221 0.360 0.060 0.313 
Indonesia 30.113 80.692 141.207 131.124 22.916 21.738 27.055 26.728 24.594 
Malaysia 34.99 80.692 129.387 140.814 26.627 26.377 20.132 19.643 22.581 
TOTAL 1272.43 968.306 968.306 968.306 968.306 968.306 968.306 968.306 968.306 
2
0
0
8
 
Trinidad & Tobago 179.086 82.267 65.813 82.933 140.349 125.942 131.423 128.592 129.209 
Oman 22.789 82.267 52.474 53.079 17.86 22.432 17.25 16.817 19.078 
Qatar 482.113 82.267 195.887 193.279 377.83 341.164 438.955 447.804 400.643 
UAE 10.356 82.267 35.721 36.723 8.116 8.755 5.506 4.384 6.975 
Algeria 143.709 82.267 117.065 106.494 112.625 114.976 101.136 97.661 108.382 
Egypt 230.727 82.267 62.517 68.088 180.82 170.038 159.348 168.501 168.066 
Equatorial Guinea 37.101 82.267 21.421 25.229 29.076 59.393 24.765 21.306 31.06 
Libya 2.114 82.267 2.851 2.581 1.657 2.562 1.057 0.261 1.77 
Nigeria 92.997 82.267 96.136 100.036 72.882 95.343 66.167 63.685 77.854 
Brunei 0.906 82.267 48.135 44.809 0.71 3.438 0.453 0.075 0.758 
Indonesia 25.242 82.267 143.711 130.754 19.782 18.782 20.419 19.27 21.132 
Malaysia 32.54 82.267 145.476 143.203 25.502 24.384 20.729 18.85 22.282 
TOTAL 1259.681 987.208 987.208 987.208 987.208 987.208 987.208 987.208 987.208 
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Figure 1 : Unit costs of imports of natural gas from GECF members ($/MMBtu) for three destinations: (A) the USA, (B) Spain, (C) Japan. 
 -9
-6
-3
0
3
6
9
Tr
in
id
ad
 &
 T
O
m
an
Q
at
ar
U
A
E
Al
ge
ria
Eg
yp
t
Eq
. G
ui
ne
a
Li
by
a
N
ig
er
ia
Br
un
ei
In
do
ne
si
a
M
al
ay
si
a
In
c
re
a
s
e
 i
n
 s
h
ip
m
e
n
ts
 (
B
c
m
)
North America Europe Asia Pacific
Figure 2: Variations in the LNG destinations induced by the adoption of the GECF’s optimal policy for the year 2007 (a positive value signals a shipment increase) 
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Figure 3 : Gains in cost and revenues derived from the adoption of the optimal solution in 2007 (in M$) 
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Figure 1 : Unit costs of imports of natural gas from GECF members ($/MMBtu) for three destinations: (A) the USA, (B) Spain, (C) Japan. 
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Figure 2: Variations in the LNG destinations induced by the adoption of the GECF’s optimal policy for the year 2007 (a positive value signals a 
shipment increase) 
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Figure 3 : Gains in cost and revenues derived from the adoption of the optimal solution in 2007 (in M$) 
